From the article "browsers, please don't kill HTTP", linked above by @JosephErnest as "Why I don't share your enthusiasm":
cash for SSL certificates
I have shared hosting. I paid $15 to a Comodo reseller for a 3-year DV certificate, which is about an order of magnitude cheaper than the domain plus hosting.
Even with the free Let's Encrypt initiative, maintaining HTTPS requires huge technicity
Some shared hosts, such as DreamHost, have a button to handle the "huge technicity" for you.
This CA has been distrusted because of backdating.
What we'd likely have is Chrome/Firefox/Safari indicating that the certificate is just "DV" domain validated.
The Comodo Dragon browser, a Chrome clone distributed by a CA, already has such a warning for DV certificates, warning the user that "the organization operating [this site] may not have undergone trusted third-party validation that it is a legitimate business." (Screenshot) But I don't see "DV may be typosquatting!!!11" warnings spreading to other browsers for two reasons. First, users would just turn it off because even Facebook has been known to use DV certificates. Second, both Mozilla and Google are sponsors of Let's Encrypt, a not-for-profit DV CA.
The URL is always known
Only the origin (scheme, hostname, and port) of an HTTPS connection are transmitted in cleartext, not anything about the path or query parameters other than their length. The port is transmitted in the TCP header, the scheme is narrowed down by the presence of a
ClientHello, and the cleartext hostname is in the Server Name Indication field of the
The argument about altering the content is very very important and I worry about this a lot - this can be solved with page signatures
In theory, TLS with a signature-only cipher suite would solve this, but for various reasons, browser makers don't want to implement this.